

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 06559 01 OF 02 031650Z POSS DUPE
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AF-10
ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03
NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
PRS-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 /134 W
-----065307 032048Z /70

R 031411Z AUG 77
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9950
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 6559

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, CCD
SUBJ: CCD: WESTERN GROUP MEETING, AUGUST 2, 1977: RW/MDW
CONSULTATIONS WITH RESPECT TO US-USSR WORKING GROUP:
MESSAGE NO. 3

1. SUMMARY : DURING AUGUST 2 MEETING OF CCD WESTERN GROUP,
US REP BRIEFED ALLIES ON US POSUTRE DURING UPCOMING ROUND
OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (RW).
END SUMMARY.

2. CCD WESTERN GROUP (CANADA, FRG, ITALY, JAPAN,
NETHERLANDS, UK, US) HELD A SPECIAL MEETING ON AUGUST 2
FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSULTING ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (RW)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 06559 01 OF 02 031650Z POSS DUPE

AND SOVIET INITIATIVE ON NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW)
PRIOR TO START OF US-USSR BILATERALS LATER IN THE DAY.
US REP (FISHER) OUTLINED US POSITION ON RW, AS PREPARED
FOR PRESENTATION TO THE SOVIETS. US REP STATED THAT THE
USG IS NOW READY TO WORK OUT KEY ELEMENTS OF AN RW BAN WITH
THE SOVIETS, TAKING THEM UP ON THEIR OFFER OF LAST MAY TO
BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. USG BELIEVES FOLLOWING FOUR KEY ELEMENTS

COULD FORM THE BASIS OF AN RW JOINT INITIATIVE, TO BE PRESENTED TO THE CCD FOR MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: (A) A COMMITMENT NOT TO USE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AS RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. (B) APPROPRIATE MEANS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, PRECLUDING IT DIVERSION TO RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. (C) AN RE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT AFFECT EXISTING OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL OR ANY OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMS CONFLICT. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, THE US REP INDICATED THAT THIS TYPE OF "SAVING" CLAUSE WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS PURSUANT TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), AS WELL AS IN REGARD TO FUTURE OBLIGATIONS, WHICH MAY RESULT FROM AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL. (D) AN RE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT APPLY TO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS OR THEIR RADIOACTIVE EFFECTS, NOR TO DEPLETED URANIUM USED IN AMMUNITION, NOR TO SMALL QUANTITIES OF RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES USED IN MILITARY ELECTRONICS OR OTHER EQUIPMENT.

3. ALTERNATE HEAD OF US DEL FOR BILATERALS (BUCHHEIM) ADDED THAT WITH REGARD TO PROTECTION OF MATERIALS THE US WOULD PREFER AS SIMPLE AN AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE, ESSENTIALLY AMOUNTING TO A COMMITMENT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE DOMESTIC MEASURES. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY FAVOR A MORE ELABORATE APPROACH, FROM WHICH WE WOULD TRY TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 06559 01 OF 02 031650Z POSS DUPE

DISSUADE THEM.

4. CANADIAN REP (JAY) ASKED WHY THE USG WANTS A TREATY OF THIS KIND. A SELF-DENYING ORDINANCE GENERALLY IMPLIES THAT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER EITHER HAS SUCH WEAPONS OR HAS PLANS FOR SUCH WEAPONS -- WHICH, AS FAR AS HE KNEW, IS NOT THE CASE. US REP RESPONDED THAT AN RW AGREEMENT WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY PREVENTIVE AND IN THIS RESPECT WOULD RESEMBLE THE SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY, PRECLUDING A POSSIBILITY WHICH IS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN. STREWING RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS IS ADMITTEDLY NOT AS FRIGHTENING AS CREATING SUCH DEBRIS BY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, THE US REP STATED, BUT THE DANGER NEVERTHELESS EXISTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 06559 02 OF 02 031654Z POSS DUPE
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AF-10
ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03
NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
PRS-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 /134 W
-----065362 032049Z /70

R 031411Z AUG 77
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9951
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 6559

5. NETHERLANDS REP (VAN DER KLAUW) ASKED WHETHER THIS US PROPOSAL DOES NOT IMPLICITLY INVITE QUESTIONS FROM THE SOVIETS ON THE PROBLEM OF THE NEUTRON BOMB, WHICH EMPLOYS RADIATION AS ITS PRIMARY MEANS OF CAUSING DESTRUCTION AND INJURY. US REP REPLIED THAT THE NEUTRON BOMB IS ACTUALLY A VERY SMALL HYDROGEN BOMB, PRODUCING ITS EFFECTS AS THE RESULT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. IF THE SOVIETS WISH TO DISCUSS THE NEUTRON BOMB, THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL TALKS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ON RW, THE US REP INDICATED, THE US INTENDS TO STICK WITH THE LANGUAGE OF THE 1948 UN COMMISSION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, REFERRING TO THEM TECHNICALLY AS QUOTE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WEAPONS UNQUOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 06559 02 OF 02 031654Z POSS DUPE

6. NETHERLANDS REP POSED A SECOND QUESTION, IN REGARD TO THE FOURTH KEY ELEMENT SET FORTH BY THE US REP: ALTHOUGH SUCH A PROVISION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR AN AGREEMENT AMONG NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES ONLY, IN A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION WOULD IT NOT IMPLY A BLESSING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE PART OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES, LEADING TO A DIFFICULTY IN THAT REGARD? US REP REPLIED THAT THIS QUESTION BASICALLY BOILED DOWN TO THE PROBLEM OF "BANNING THE BOMB,"

WHICH IS NOT THE QUESTION HERE. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE
EVENTUAL RW AGREEMENT WOULD STATE EXPLICITLY WHAT IT PROHIBITS,
AND THAT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS WOULD CLEARLY NOT BE
INCLUDED IN THE PROHIBITION. SINCE THE TREATY WOULD NEITHER
MENTION NOR APPLY TO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS, WE WOULD
ARGUE THAT ADHERENCE BY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WOULD IN
NO WAY IMPLY A "BLESSING" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR PART.
VANDEN HEUVEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISARMAMENT, MEETINGS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 03-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977GENEVA06559
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770278-0424
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197708102/aaaadjdb.tel
Line Count: 178
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: bf91144f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1408388
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CCD: WESTERN GROUP MEETING, AUGUST 2, 1977: RW/MDW CONSULTATIONS WITH RESPECT TO US-USSR WORKING GROUP: MESSAGE NO. 3
TAGS: PARM, SZ, US, UR, CCD
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/bf91144f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009